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NGO power and influence to change corporate behavior has grown 
exponentially over the past ten years, but little research has been done on 
this phenomenon. This research report presents a great starting point 
from which to advise companies on how to manage, track, engage, and 
partner with NGOs in the future, particularly for Ford. Ford's senior 




Non -governmental organizations (NGOs) have embarked upon a new strategy of 
corporate engagement, the market campaign. Market campaigns are built on the 
perception that corporations are greedy and self-serving and tie into the general 
public distrust of corporations. This paper captures and summarizes the current 
thinking on market campaigns. Few corporate or NGO representatives were 
willing to discuss their campaign experiences and response strategies. Although 
patterns may emerge as the market campaign phenomenon continues, market 
campaigns are largely a "black box." 
The best campaign target is a consumer-oriented company that depends upon 
strong brand equity. Companies that sit at the back end of a highly complex value 
chain are less likely to be targeted. Large companies are also good targets. 
Achieving the desired change in corporate behavior is a market campaign's 
ultimate success metric. The degree of urgency created within the target company 
is an important success metric as well. Successful campaigns have a high degree 
of public appeal, and NGOs perceive that the likelihood of campaign success is 
inversely related to how far the truth needs to be stretched. 
The first phase of a market campaign begins with the target receiving but ignoring 
early signals that a conflict is brewing. The second phase involves denial and 
surprise. The target begins to take action in the third phase and important truths 
about the target's organizational culture with regard to transparency and handling 
criticism are revealed. The fourth phase involves substantively addressing the 
crisis situation and the claims of the campaign organizer. In the fifth phase, the 
target begins its internal evaluation of the crisis. 
This paper presents a model for understanding the probability that a nascent 
campaign will become a crisis. The model considers the organizer's message, the 
perceived level of participation, the ability to engage the target, the perceived 
likelihood of success, susceptibility to influence, and the availability of and 
preference for substitute products. 
Our research did not identify any case studies that point to gaps in Ford's current 
NGO engagement strategy. However, we have developed six recommendations 
that enhance and reinforce Ford's approach. These include continuing to monitor 
early warning signals, providing issue briefs to key Ford managers on a regular 
basis, leveraging Ford's media resources, better defining Ford's reputation among 
the general public, involving a wider range of Ford professionals in stakeholder 
dialogues, and documenting Ford's internal experience with market campaign 
management more thoroughly in order to maximize organizational learning. 
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Introduction and Purpose 
Companies are increasingly aware of the need to protect their reputations. In a 
survey carried out by Aon, a Chicago-based risk management and insurance 
brokerage firm, chief executives named loss of reputation as the greatest risk 
facing their business (Houlder 2001). The notion that companies need only meet 
the expectations of their shareholders and maintain commercial success is 
outdated. Consumers want more than just a functional product at a competitive 
price. They want to know how a product is made, that workers are treated fairly, 
and that the company's environmental impacts are minimized. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are stepping in to define what is 
expected of companies, and there is a general consensus that the power of NGOs 
is growing (Ferguson 1997, Williams 1999, Cowell 2000, Alden 2001, Cowe 
2001, Gereffi et al. 2001, Runyan 2001). Traditionally, NGOs directed their 
resources toward lobbying the government for more strict and transparent 
regulations that would force a change in industry behavior. This process was 
often slow, produced few results, and required long, complicated bouts of 
litigation. 
In the 1990s, NGOs began to utilize more direct forms of engagement and 
accountability. With the explosion of internet-based communication, NGOs 
found that they could gather and distribute real-time information easily and 
quickly. They were able to form alliances, rally consumers, and garner attention 
from media sources much more easily than they had in the past. Aided by 
technological advances and experiencing increased frustration over the inaction of 
corporations with regard to pressing environmental and social needs, NGOs began 
to embark upon a new strategy of engagement, the market campaign. 
Ecos Corporation (2001) defines market campaigns as public awareness and 
education efforts targeted at individual corporations and, in some cases, entire 
industry sectors. Campaigners spread their messages and demands anywhere and 
everywhere that will get the attention of both the campaign target and the general 
public. Specific campaign approaches include boycotts, protests, shareholder 
resolutions, and targeting the links in a company or industry's value chain that are 
most susceptible to potentially negative public opinion. Market campaigns can be 
simultaneously punitive and constructive in pursuing the core objective of driving 
change in industry behavior. The most constructive campaigns articulate a 
commercial "way out" for the campaign target. 
NGOs perceive that direct, multi-pronged attacks on corporate reputations are 
more likely to produce change at the speed and scale required to make a 
difference to environmental and social crises. The increasing attention to climate 
change is an example of an environmental and social issue where lobbying 
government has largely failed to produce results. In turn, NGOs are beginning to 
pursue companies that produce products or employ processes that contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions. Products within this category that have strong brand 
identity are the most likely to be targets. 
The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of market campaigns for the 
Corporate Governance Office of Ford Motor Company. Ford is experiencing 
significant NGO pressure on the climate change and product safety fronts, largely 
due to its prominence in the sport utility vehicle market. Human rights issues 
within Ford's extensive supply chain are coming to the fore as well. After a brief 
history of market campaigns, this report defines campaigns more precisely and 
introduces a framework for determining the credibility of a campaign threat. It 
ends with strategies for diffusing market campaign threats and strategic 
recommendations for Ford's Corporate Governance Office. 
History of Market Campaigns 
Corporate campaigns were first conceived in 1965 by Students for a Democratic 
Society, academics at the University of Michigan, and the National Council of 
Churches. These groups formed a student-led, anti-corporate structure, which 
was joined in 1970 by Saul Alinsky, a widely regarded community organizer. By 
combining Alinsky's experience in activist strategies with academic research on 
shaping human behavior through communication, the pieces of corporate 
campaigns came together (Manheim 2001). 
The early market campaigners formed alliances with organized labor, and labor 
became the public face of the campaign. Union-based campaigns laid the 
groundwork and provided a framework for today's NGO-led campaigns. 
However there are some important differences. Campaigns fronted by organized 
labor have a fundamental weakness in that the union and the company have 
similar interests in not wanting the company to go out of business. It is politically 
dangerous for unions to be accused of supporting causes that substantially weaken 
employers. The shared interests in the long-term health of the company create 
common ground upon which campaign grievances and demands can be addressed. 
In contrast, NGOs typically have no employment or investment interests in the 
target company or industry. NGO-led campaigns often have much stronger 
ideological roots than do labor-based campaigns, a fact that plays an important 
role in the court of public opinion. Although NGO's may appear less financially 
formidable than organized labor, non-labor campaign organizers are held in 
higher public regard than are labor-based campaigns. Thus, not only do 
corporations face a more publicly trusted adversary, this adversary has far less 
interest in the long-term viability of the company. In the worst case scenario, the 
NGO may perceive that the only solution to the problem is the company's 
complete demise, and it may be impossible to identify common points from which 
to begin a constructive dialogue. However, this worst-case scenario is rare. It is 
far more likely that a campaign threatening NGOs only seeks to engage directly 
with corporate decision makers. According to SustainAbility, there has been a 
shift from problem-focused to solution-focused advocacy on the part of 
campaigners (Houlder 2001). 
The rise of sophisticated NGO-led campaigns presents a whole new set of 
challenges, the most daunting of which may be the increased pressure NGOs are 
putting on corporations. As Figure 1 shows, the number of campaign references 
in the media has doubled from the 1980s to the 1990s. Whether the rising number 
of media references correlates with the actual number of campaigns or is merely a 
sign of an increasing preference for anti-corporate stories among news consumers, 
NGOs are saddling corporations with an unprecedented level of public exposure 
and criticism. 
Figure 1. (Source: Manheim, 2001) 
Corporate Campaigns in the Media 
Number of References, By Year, 1974-98 
In addition to the rapid increase in the number of campaigns, the intensity and 
sophistication of NGO activism in the markets is rising, according to Roger 
Robinson, Chairman of the William Casey Institute (Alden 2001). The growth of 
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U.S. pension and mutual funds and the increased importance of the U.S. capital 
markets as a source of financing for domestic and foreign companies have 
provided powerful sources of leverage for NGOs that were not available a decade 
ago. 
The dynamics of market campaigns are poorly understood by both companies and 
academics who study corporate accountability and public opinion. Because 
campaigns often involve prolonged periods of dialogue, and because the rate of 
change in corporations is slow, few best practices have emerged from 
comparisons of successful and unsuccessful campaigns. The propensity of 
corporations to enter into extended dialogues with campaign organizers and the 
increasing trends toward solution-based campaigns makes it difficult to find 
examples of companies that have been injured solely as a result of a poorly 
handled campaign. NGOs are generally unwilling to share their campaign 
strategies with outside parties, which means that there is little comprehension of 
the breadth and dynamics of the closely coordinated efforts involved with a 
campaign. The implication is that a campaign target is forced to approach each 
new campaign launched against it with a well communicated company-wide 
response strategy and a great deal of caution. 
Characteristics of Market Campaigns 
Generally, NGOs attempt to meet with the company directly before launching a 
campaign. If the company relegates the engagement to the public relations 
department and refuses executive level involvement, it is likely that the company 
and the NGO will come to a deadlock. When the NGO perceives a deadlock, it 
will go public with a campaign, educating consumers about company practices 
with which the campaign takes issue. 
Campaigns are conducted in the media, where the campaign organizer seeks to 
redefine the image and undermine the reputation of the targeted company through 
systematic and unrelenting pressure (Manheim, 2001). Components of the 
corporate image under attack might include any combination of the company's 
emotional appeal, its aura of social responsibility, impressions of its workplace 
environment, the quality and safety of products and services, the vision and 
leadership of its management, and its financial performance. Campaigns are built 
on the perception that corporations are greedy and self-serving and tie into the 
general public distrust of corporations (World Bank 2001). 
Campaigns can last from a few weeks to five years. According to Jarol Manheim 
(2001), Professor of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington University's 
Elliot School of International Affairs, characteristics and objectives of campaigns 
include: 
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• defining the moral high ground in such a way as to ensure that 
the activist group holds it and that the company cannot; 
• tapping into the underlying distrust that many Americans feel 
about major corporations; 
• evoking strong feelings about social problems that can be 
blamed on the success of corporations; 
• questioning which side can claim alignment with the dominant 
values of society and which side is violating the public interest 
to serve its own purposes; and 
• pressuring a company's financial stakeholders directly. 
Another important characteristic of market campaigns is the fact that the lead 
NGO often represents a coalition of interests. The limited market campaign 
literature emphasizes that the Internet provides campaign organizers with a rapid 
and efficient means to form alliances with organizations and communities that 
have a stake in the campaigns outcome. Campaign organizers can send news 
items, meeting notes, and copies of communications with corporate 
representatives to their coalition network. The ability to distribute such items 
through email or publicly available websites allows NGOs to expand the reach 
and scope of market campaigns, casting a wider net for recruiting campaign 
participants and sympathizers. 
Coalitions can be problematic for campaign targets because they create campaigns 
based on multiple and possibly unrelated issues. For example, in 1997, the 
Southern Baptist Convention, a cornerstone of right wing conservatism, joined 
forces with the National Labor Committee, which has been traditionally aligned 
with the Democratic Party, to protest Disney. The Baptists were concerned about 
Disney's pro-gay stance and the "immoral" nature of music CDs produced and 
marketed by Disney subsidiaries. The Labor Committee was already involved in 
a campaign to discredit Disney for child labor and substandard wages in its 
overseas production facilities. 
Characteristics of a Good Target Company 
According to Chris Hatch, Executive Director of the Rainforest Action Network 
(RAN), the best campaign target is a consumer-oriented company that has 
developed and depends upon strong brand equity. These targets have the most to 
lose from successful assaults to their reputations. Hatch considers high brand 
equity the most important characteristic of the company, more so than the 
lifecycles or purchase cycles of the products the company produces. 
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Companies that sit at the back end of a highly complex value chain are less likely 
to be targeted, especially if the consumer makes no connection with the product 
and the company that actually produces it. For example, the vast majority of 
consumers do not know the names of the companies that supply beef to 
McDonald's or plywood to Home Depot. In such cases, it may be difficult for a 
market campaign to build support around a company directly involved in 
production. Campaign organizers are more likely to identify and target a link in 
the value chain that has more public recognition and a far higher stake in 
maintaining strong brand equity. Additionally, campaigners may be more 
efficient in forcing change throughout the entire supply chain or across the 
industry by targeting the large, point-of-sale brand company. For example, NGOs 
may be more efficient in forcing change in the beef industry by attacking 
McDonald's, one of the industry's major buyers. Home Depot's recent 
announcement that it would make certified timber available in its stores was the 
direct result of NGOs turning from campaigns directed at large timber companies 
to a single campaign directed at perhaps the industry's most publicly visible 
customer. 
Another characteristic of a good target is size. If the NGO campaign wishes to 
bring attention to the practices of an entire industry, the largest companies and 
brands in the industry will be targeted. The logic is that forcing change in an 
industry's largest members will have a trickle-down or radiating effect to the rest 
of the industry. A larger target also makes for an easier target because it probably 
has higher recognition among consumers and as such is a better media draw. 
Following Home Depot's announcement that they would switch to certified 
timber, other lumber retailers, such as Lowe's, made similar announcements. 
Determinants of Success 
The ultimate success measure of a campaign is achieving the desired change in 
corporate behavior. In most cases, a commitment from the target company to 
work with the organizing NGO on a change process is perceived as successful 
enough to temporarily halt a public campaign. Until such commitments are 
received, NGOs define their campaign progress and success in terms of activities 
carried out, such as number of media articles and number of demonstrations. Not 
only do these metrics appeal to the NGO's donors, they can be used to create a 
sense of urgency in the campaign target. 
Creating a sense of urgency is an important part of campaign strategy. According 
to Chris Hatch, a target company's response team typically has at the lead a 
creative thinker with the ear of upper level management. However, this person is 
usually in a community or public affairs department and has no ability to create 
the desired change. If the NGO can create a sense of urgency by communicating 
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a sense of mounting pressure, the response team leader can elevate the issue to the 
consideration of upper level management, where the true change leaders reside. 
In effect, urgency gives the issue a "consideration space" that it did not have 
before. Urgency tactics are especially effective with companies that have voiced 
a desire to change their business practices and "do the right thing" but have been 
slow to do so. The Rainforest Action Network attributes its successful campaign 
against Home Depot's sales of old growth and endangered wood on their ability 
to create urgency and a consideration space in a company that wanted to address 
the issue but had consistently given it low priority. 
Another important success factor is the "sex appeal" of the campaign objectives. 
Sexy campaigns are more effective because they induce members of the public 
(preferably the target company's customers) to communicate their support of the 
campaign cause. The certified timber campaign against Home Depot, which had 
a great deal of public support, is an example of a sexy campaign. On the other 
hand, a campaign launched by the Rainforest Action Network in the early 1990's 
against Mitsubishi to reduce logging of old-growth timber had little sex appeal 
and failed to rally much public interest. Although sex appeal can be measured 
through the use of focus groups and surveys, doing so is often beyond the ability 
of organizing NGOs. Thus, NGOs classify sex appeal as a largely intangible 
success factor. 
Finally, the likelihood of campaign success is inversely related to how far the 
truth needs to be stretched and directly related to how far it can be stretched 
(Manheim 2001). If the public views the company as a model corporate citizen, 
the NGO will probably need to stretch the truth quite far, and it may not be able 
to. Such campaigns are unlikely to become full-blown media wars. On the other 
hand, if the public generally views the target corporation as a corporate outlaw, 
the NGO may not need to stretch the truth, and the company's performance record 
will speak for itself. 
Quantifiable effects of successful campaigns, such as reductions in a target's sales 
volume or stock price, are far more elusive. None of the experts interviewed for 
this paper were able to identify any examples of measurable profit and loss effects 
solely attributable to market campaigns. They emphasized that the frequently 
cited example of Monsanto as a company that was nearly destroyed by a market 
campaign is inaccurate. Monsanto experienced a failed merger with American 
Home Products at the same time. Separating the contribution of each struggle to 
the company's precipitous drop in stock price is, in their assessment, impossible. 
Those interviewed also agreed that most companies have engaged campaign 
organizers before campaigns could materialize into something that affected the 
bottom line. In other cases, they believed that the purchasing behavior of 
individual consumers would have never had a pronounced effect on the 
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company's bottom line (e.g. Conaco and Unacal). In some cases, companies had 
created a few new staff positions to deal with NGO relations, but it seems that 
corporations have suffered no significant financial consequences of market 
campaigns. With regard to the successful campaign against Home Depot, Kim 
Drye, Environmental Affairs Manager at Home Depot, said that the company 
experienced no loss in sales during the campaign, nor did they perceive any 
damage to their reputation. In fact, Ms. Drye reported that during the campaign 
the company received letters of support from customers and community members, 
and the Harris Poll named Home Depot as a top company for social responsibility. 
If anything, the campaign strengthened Home Depot's reputation. 
Phases of a Crisis 
During a campaign, there is ample opportunity for a crisis to occur. The crisis 
may emerge as a single event, such as the chemical gas leak at the Union Carbide 
plant in Bhopal, India, or as a drawn out escalation of ideological conflict. 
Schwartz and Gibb (1999) describe five phases of a crisis, the fist of which 
typically begins with the target receiving but ignoring (or suppressing) early 
signals that a conflict is brewing. There is a hesitancy to act on early signals, 
which leads directly to the second phase. Once the target realizes a market 
campaign has been launched against it, the organization goes into denial. 
Everyone acts as if they were caught completely unawares. The campaign is 
discussed with words such as "inconceivable" or "impossible" and with other 
language that indicates no existing planning processes had envisioned the 
possibility of such a situation. 
The target begins to take action in the third phase. Because events are moving so 
fast, people within the target have little time to think before they act. This phase 
is crucial, because important truths about the target's organizational culture are 
revealed, especially with regard to transparency and handling criticism. If each 
individual responds in the way that he or she perceives as best, the target can 
quickly send a tangle of inconsistent messages to the campaign organizer and the 
media, further exacerbating the problem. The CEO's personal leadership style 
plays a key role in this phase as well. How the public perceives the company and 
how employees react will be direct functions of the CEO's message and tone of 
delivery. Both campaign organizers and the general public will examine the 
CEO's behavior, looking specifically at whether the CEO focuses on attacking the 
critics, on damage control and denial, or on personally concentrating on matters 
that the public feels strongly about (i.e. the issues at the heart of the campaign). 
The fourth phase involves substantively addressing the crisis situation and the 
claims of the campaign organizer. Some level of damage control and denial will 
be involved as the target attempts to wrest control of the issue from the organizer. 
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However, damage control and denial cannot overshadow the organizer's and 
public's perceptions that the target is addressing the issues honestly and 
compassionately. Companies that emerge safely from the crisis tend to be those 
in which senior management is personally and visibly involved by focusing on 
substantive responses to the victims or potential victims of the event (whether a 
particular town, an ecosystem, or air quality in general) and by communicating 
clear direction to employees. 
The fifth and final phase of the campaign crisis begins after the target has engaged 
the organizer and addressed the issue at hand. At this time, the target begins its 
internal evaluation of the crisis, viewing it as an opportunity to learn and prepare 
for similar altercations in the future. Although the importance of this phase is 
often overlooked, mindful companies will take key learnings from the experience 
and use them to inform the organization's culture and crisis management strategy. 
Diffusing an Attack 
The rise of NGO power has generated concern in corporate America. Corporate 
officers may not be aware of NGO grievances until a large coalition of 
organizations has formed against the company. In some cases companies find 
themselves up against campaigns based on inaccurate or completely misleading 
information. Conaco claims that the controversy over its Yadana natural gas 
pipeline in Myanmar is such an example (Unocal 2000). Given that so much of 
corporate reputation rests on perception rather than facts and that the public tends 
to trust NGOs more than business, a company battling a campaign may find its 
reputation in a precarious situations. 
The pressure and frustration experienced by campaign targets must be controlled. 
Otherwise the target may find itself directly responsible for strengthening the 
campaign. Some campaigns aim to cause senior executives to lose personal 
control. Campaign organizers employ tactics or forms of communication that 
make target leadership angry and launch vicious counterattacks. From the NGO's 
perspective, such tactics are successful when the public perceives corporate 
leaders as over-compensating and over-responding. The public associates such 
responses with guilt, attempted cover up, and another episode in a pattern of 
defensive, negative behavior (Lukaszewski 2000). With each negative corporate 
response, whether making excuses or delivering threats, the company loses public 
respect, public trust, and public credibility. In effect, corporate leaders do the 
NGO's reputation damaging work for them. 
The best way to diffuse an attack is to keep a level head. A recent article in The 
Green Business Letter (Anonymous 2001) recommends that companies practice 
the following in their interactions with NGOs: 
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• Work to detect early warning signals of a campaign by 
engaging potential campaigners in constructive dialogues. 
• Practice honesty, humanity, and modesty in all interactions. 
• Be aware that the tone of information may be less important 
than where within the company the conflict is being handled. 
• Reveal the company's human side (e.g. number of employees 
and family members potentially affected by the campaign's 
demands) to diffuse tension. 
• Keep the conversation as private as possible to avoid public 
posturing. 
The ideal response would incorporate each of these recommendations. Moreover, 
the company's tone and style of engagement should be consistent across different 
NGOs. Undoubtedly, NGOs are "comparing notes" after each engagement, 
scrutinizing the content and quality of the target's response. As with an overly 
defensive CEO, mixed messages from the target can be used to fuel claims of 
evasion and cover up in the media. 
Evaluating the Credibility of a Campaign Threat 
For a market campaign to achieve its goal, it must achieve some critical mass. 
Otherwise, it is unlikely that it will create the desired sense of urgency in the 
target company. Critical mass can be achieved in two general ways. First, the 
NGO leading the campaign or an NGO partnering in the campaign may have high 
brand equity or press visibility. Organizations such as the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and the 
Sierra Club are examples of NGOs that can create a critical mass quite easily. Sin 
general, smaller organizations desire to associate with them. Campaign targets 
would make a mistake if they did not treat seriously campaigns supported by 
these NGOs. At the local level, there may be much smaller organizations, such as 
parent-teacher associations, civic groups, or faith-based groups, with significant 
local influence. Thus, it behooves potential campaign targets to know and 
understand the influence of potential campaign organizers at all levels, whether 
global or local. 
The second method for achieving critical mass involves savvy communication 
strategies and rapid coalition building. Smaller, relatively unknown NGOs may 
use this tactic when taking on a large corporation. Perhaps the greatest example 
of a successful small organization achieving a critical mass through aggressive 
communications was the campaign lead by Global Witness against DeBeers over 
"conflict diamonds." Global Witness, which boasted 14 employees, used the 
media with such expertise that DeBeers went from a position of antagonism to the 
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world's leader in diamond certification and policing (Malloy 2001, Marozzi 
2001). 
Regardless of how the market campaign gains critical mass, it must do so by 
drawing other parties to its cause. Understanding how campaign organizers 
induce others to join and support the campaign is a key step in developing a 
strategy for evaluating the damage potential of a campaign and potentially 
diluting its effects. Important insight can be gained from research on the factors 
that influence individual consumers to join company or product boycotts. Sen 
and colleagues have identified seven factors that influence the decision to 
participate (Sen et al. in press). They are: 
• the organizer's message, 
• the expected level participation, 
• the perceived ability to engage the target, 
• the perceived likelihood of success, 
• the susceptibility to anti-campaign pressure, and 
• the availability of and preference for substitutes for the product 
or service. 
The interaction of these seven factors are diagramed in Figure 2. The application 
of the individual consumer boycott model to NGO-led market campaigns requires 
little modification. The model rests on the ability of an organizer to create 
momentum and mass in an anti-corporate movement. Thus, it serves as a useful 
tool for evaluating the likelihood that a campaign will escalate to crisis 
proportions. The following sections discuss each element of the model in detail. 
Perceived Likelihood of Success and Campaign Participation 
Each potential campaign supporter must make a decision about whether or not the 
campaign will achieve its goal of changing the target's behavior. Each potential 
participant makes this decision because he or she wants to know whether 
becoming involved will generate an association with a failure or a success. In 
most cases, individuals and organizations want to be on a winning team. 
However, espousing the organization's ideological mission in the media may be 
more important than a successful outcome. This decision is influenced by the 
mediating effects of the pro-campaign message, the perceived ability of the 
organizer to engage the target, and the expectation of overall participation. 
Once the potential supporter makes a decision regarding the campaign's 
likelihood of success, the supporter must make the decision whether or not to 
actually support the campaign. The supporter's susceptibility to influence and the 
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preference for and availability of substitutes for the target's products or services 
will influence this decision after the likelihood of success has been evaluated. 
Organizer's Message 
The campaign organizer's message influences other parties to participate in the 
campaign by influencing the perceived level of participation and, to a lesser 
extent, the perceived likelihood of success. Messages that articulate the positive 
aspects of the campaign are more successful at generating support. Positive 
messages create motivation by helping potential supporters to visualize the 
positive societal outcomes associated with the boycott. 
Figure 2. Market campaign evaluation model (modified from Sen et al., in press). 
Negative messages that focus only on the wrongdoings of the boycott target have 
a strong opposite effect. Negative messages typically emphasize the 
consequences of boycott failure and may create a sense of powerlessness. 
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Potential participants are unable to conceptualize the positive outcome and 
therefore cannot share the campaign organizer's vision of a "better future." 
Expected Participation 
The perception of participation in the campaign has a direct effect on the 
likelihood of a sympathizer actually joining the campaign. As the expectation of 
overall participation increases, so does the likelihood of joining. Not only are 
potential supporters swayed by strength in numbers, they also perceive that many 
others will share in any inconveniences created by the campaign. As participatory 
momentum grows, each individual or organization believes that it is likely to 
share in a success. Also, no one organization or individual is overly burdened 
with coordination of the entire effort. 
As previously mentioned, the perception of overall participation is mediated by 
whether the campaign organizer sends positive or negative messages. Positive 
messages increase the perception of participation, while negative messages reduce 
it. 
Ability to Engage 
One of the goals of a market campaign is to engage the campaign target. A key 
step in growing the campaign's support base is communicating that the campaign 
will successfully engage the target. If campaign organizers communicate that it 
will be difficult to engage the target, potential campaign supporters will be more 
likely to join the campaign. They will perceive that their individual or 
organizational participation will give the campaign the necessary weight to get the 
target's attention. Moreover, if a campaign organizer successfully communicates 
that the target is unwilling to engage, the organizer can take advantage of an 
underdog position. The perception of overall participation becomes less 
important in this case, because the tendency to "root for the underdog" supercedes 
the need to belong to a large group. 
On the other hand, if potential participants feel that the organizer's ability to 
engage the target is high, they will be less likely to participate, feeling that their 
participation will make less of an overall difference. In this case, the overall 
expectation of participation plays a relatively more important role. 
Susceptibility to Anti-Campaign Influence 
Potential supporters can be influenced to participate or not participate in the 
boycott by a number of proximate influence factors. Organizations may be 
influenced by their members, organizations under the same cause umbrella (e.g. 
human rights or the environment), their donors, and political forces. Small, 
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relatively unknown organizations may be influenced to join a boycott because 
they want to increase their public profile and legitimacy. They are looking for a 
success story to augment their organizational brand. Family, neighbors, civic 
leaders, and employers may have significant sway over individual NGO 
employees. There may be social or economic repercussions for joining or not 
joining the campaign. 
Susceptibility to influence affects the relative importance of expected 
participation. For persons or organizations highly susceptible to influence, the 
relative importance of participation will be higher. These potential supporters are 
unwilling to act if they think they will be doing so in a small group or, in the 
worst case, alone. They may lack the skills to engage a large target or may be 
unwilling to bear the risks involved in a high profile stance. They find strength 
and legitimacy in numbers. Individuals and organizations relatively less 
susceptible to influence will not rely on the perception of participation as much. 
These entities are individual actors who act more out of internal motivation and 
are more willing to make sacrifices (in terms of product availability or organizing 
costs) for what they perceive as a greater social good. 
Availability of Substitutes and Preference for the Target's Product 
An important part of any decision to participate in a campaign is the perception of 
costs the individual or organization will incur. In the case of campaigns against 
specific products or services, the costs of the campaign will be perceived as much 
lower when substitutes are readily available and the preference for the substitute 
is greater than the preference for the target's product. Also, high availability of 
and preference for substitutes reduces the importance of a high level of perceived 
participation. The logic behind this argument states that any consumer or 
organization has to consider the costs of joining a campaign, and cost can be 
measured by the availability of and preference for substitutes (i.e., if substitutes 
are rare or not preferred, costs are high). If the costs are high, most consumers 
and organizations will join only if many others also join and share the cost. 
Similarly, if preferred substitutes exist, the cost participating is low. Individuals 
and organizations are able to bear the burden easily, and solidarity with a larger 
"cause" is not as important. 
Organizations that consider joining a campaign must think about substitutes 
beyond the target company's products and services. For example, campaign 
organizers and supporters risk being discredited in the community or in the media. 
Joining a campaign may create negative feelings among an NGO's donors, 
agency allies, and membership as well. If such stakeholders are not critical and 
can be easily replaced, then there are substitutes for the NGO, and joining the 
campaign has few costs. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
The phenomenon of NGO-led market campaigns is fairly new. Although NGOs-
led campaigns have scored some significant success, including DeBeers diamond 
certification program and Home Depot's push to demand sustainable timber 
certification from its suppliers, few clear trends in market campaign dynamics 
have emerged. In part, our research was limited by the unwillingness of both 
NGOs and corporations to discuss market campaigns candidly with outsiders. 
Such reluctance is not surprising. Market campaigns are fought in the court of 
public opinion, and it is important that both parties control information that might 
undermine their current engagements or their overall engagement strategy. 
We were unable to find examples of companies that had suffered negative 
consequences related solely to ignoring or otherwise handling poorly a NGO-led 
campaign. Thus, comparisons with successful and unsuccessful responses were 
not possible. Our interviews and literature reviews did not reveal any significant 
financial implications of NGO-led market campaigns. It appears that most 
companies confronted with a market campaign threat have engaged the NGO 
early in the process, averting the creation of a full-blown crisis situation that 
would be expensive to stop were it ever started. 
So what do NGO-led campaigns mean for Ford? Ford is a huge brand and in 
many respects the company is a sustainability leader in the global auto industry. 
In a recent Financial Times poll of CEOs, NGOs, and media leaders regarding 
environmental reputation of companies, the NGO and media leaders ranked Ford 
4th out of 20 companies (FT.com 2001b).1 CEOs ranked Ford 13th of 29 
companies that made the list (FT.com 2001a). Ford earned high rankings largely 
because of its initiatives in national parks, the Rouge facility renovation, and its 
recycling efforts. Ford's competitors, Toyota and Honda were cited as leaders 
because of their alternative fuel vehicles. Finally, in the 2002 listing of the 
world's most respected companies, Ford ranked 13 of 50, a significant 
improvement over its rank of 43 in 2000 (FT.com 2001c, 2001d).2 
Although Ford receives a great deal of pressure from NGOs, it appears that the 
company's current strategy of engagement is effective and constructive. Ford's 
most generalized engagement tactic is its annual report on environmental and 
social issues. This report communicates Ford's position and action with regard to 
a large portfolio of issues, highlighting both accomplishments and ongoing 
challenges. When potential campaign crises do erupt, the Corporate Governance 
1 In the same survey, Honda ranked 3rd, and Toyota ranked 8th. 
2 In the same survey, Toyota ranked sixth, General Motors ranked eleventh, Daimler-Chrysler 
ranked sixteenth, BMW ranked 24th, Volkswagen ranked 39,h, and Porsche ranked 44th. 
15 
16 
• Corporate Campaign, Inc.,5 which focuses on campaigns led 
by labor unions. 
Communicate Issues Within the Company on a Regular Basis 
Ford must ensure that the rest of the company is aware of early signals and is 
prepared to respond to questions should a heightened media campaign arise. The 
company must be prepared to speak one consistent message so that no individual 
employee's personal feelings are not taken as Ford's official position. 
To this end, we recommend that the Corporate Governance Office adopt an issues 
communication strategy similar to the one currently used by Intel. Each week, an 
issues alert is sent to key people within the company. The alert presents 
important stakeholder management issues, carefully detailing the names of key 
persons within the NGO, the NGOs stance, and a brief synopsis of the company's 
position. More importantly, the alert identifies the internal owner of each issue, 
the person within the company to whom all inquiries should be directed. By 
identifying this person, all employees know to whom to direct inquiries, and they 
do not make the mistake of offering an opinion or information that could 
undermine the company's engagement strategy. 
Leverage Ford's Media Resources 
NGO-led market campaigns are essentially public opinion trials that are 
conducted in the media. The Corporate Governance Office should take full 
advantage of Ford's media resources to notify stakeholders and the public at large 
about the company's sustainability efforts. The message should highlight the 
potential gains and risks associated with ongoing and future initiatives. All 
accomplishments should be carefully couched as interim and as part of a long and 
challenging struggle "to do what's right" and "make the world a better place." In 
addition, the talents and resources of Ford's media relations professionals could 
be used to develop and disseminate the issues briefs discussed above. 
Document the Public's Opinion 
In political campaigns, it is disastrous to let your opponent define you. Similarly, 
you should never let your opponent tell you what the public thinks of you. You 
should do this research yourself. 
We recommend that Ford's Corporate Governance Office implement a well 
designed market research effort that provides a quantitative, scientifically valid 
assessment of Ford's reputation. Currently, Ford receives public opinion data that 
3 www.corporateGampaign.org 
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is largely tied to its product quality and performance (e.g. warranty claims, 
customer complaints, surveys by J.D. Power and Associates). However, these 
sources of information are probably not appropriate for gauging any metric 
related to reputation. 
The Corporate Governance Office needs to assess how the public feels about 
Ford. Information from NGOs is undoubtedly biased, reflecting the feelings of 
those most closely associated with the NGO's cause. Because the success or 
failure of market campaigns largely hinges on swaying public opinion, target 
companies must have a firm grasp of where they stand in the public's collective 
mind. 
Conducting such a research exercise need not be expensive and can be easily 
outsourced. A portfolio of scientifically valid market research techniques exist 
that can be used to probe feelings about the company, not its products or reaction 
to its advertisements. Most techniques are executable with common desktop 
software, and there are many companies that sell lists of potential respondents 
fitting specific demographic or socioeconomic profiles. Ford probably has such 
lists available in its product development or public relations units. A pilot study 
of this nature could be conducted easily and inexpensively as part of a MBA-level 
class in quantitative market research. 
Involve All Parts of Ford in Stakeholder Dialogues 
If Bill Ford, Jr., continues to take a pro-sustainability stance, Ford will 
undoubtedly come under fire from more NGOs wishing to push their agenda with 
a potentially receptive company. As the number of potential stakeholder 
dialogues increases, the Corporate Governance Office will be quickly 
overwhelmed. One strategy to deal with an increased workload is to hire more 
personnel. However, doing so does not go very far in creating an organizational 
culture that deals with NGO confrontations in a constructive manner. We 
recommend that the Corporate Governance Office include more representatives of 
mid- and upper-level management in stakeholder dialogues and dialogue training. 
Not only will NGOs perceive that they are being more fully engaged, the 
Corporate Governance Office begins a process of educating people within Ford 
about stakeholder management strategies and techniques. 
Although including persons not accustomed to representing Ford to the NGO 
community may pose risks (e.g. off the cuff comments, angry reactions), we 
believe that doing so is critical if Ford is to have robust campaign management 
know-how. Involving more internal stakeholders may require a substantial time 
investment in issue briefings, conflict management workshops, and scenario 
training. Making a larger group of Ford management comfortable and effective in 
sensitive discussions with NGOs is a long-term process and one that we believe is 
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necessary if Ford is to develop a leadership base that is well versed in stakeholder 
engagement. 
Lastly, face-to-face stakeholder dialogues should not be overly populated with 
personnel from Ford's media offices. Doing so can send a strong negative 
message that Ford is preparing to take a defensive, damage control stance on the 
issue. While it is certainly important for media personnel to be involved with 
stakeholder engagement, their presence at meetings must be balanced with 
representatives from product development, finance, and other areas in order to 
send the proper signals to the NGO. 
Document Engagement Experiences to Increase Learning 
Our research was hampered by a lack of information about market campaign 
management from companies and NGOs alike. With regard to companies, it 
seemed like the few organizations we were able to interview had not taken a long, 
hard look at their campaign management experiences. Ford should not fall into 
this trap. We believe that if members of the Corporate Governance Office 
contacted other companies directly, there might be a more open flow of 
information. 
In addition, we believe that Ford would benefit by more thoroughly capturing its 
own reactions to external pressures and negative stakeholder comments. 
Evaluating the path of communication and flow of information should provide 
greater opportunity for strengthening the communication of issues such as these. 
Moreover, doing so should insulate the company from a significant loss of 
organizational wisdom that might occur if any of the current Corporate 
Governance Office staff were to leave the company for any reason. Careful 
attention to taking meeting notes and extensive follow-up interviews with key 
Ford players, both during and after engagements, will capture the internal 
experiences, perceptions, and feelings. It may be more valuable to convene 
internal "focus groups" of key players both during and after specific engagements 
in order to get a sense of which individuals and groups are more or less aligned 
with the Corporate Governance Office's overall vision of organizational response. 
By having discussions with members of different groups affected by the campaign 
or campaign threat, tensions across groups may be more apparent than they would 
in individual interviews. 
The Sen et al. model can also be an important framework for understanding and 
evaluating campaigns both during and after the fact. Does Ford have enough 
information about campaigns to use the model? For example, does Ford know the 
types of messages the NGO is communicating to the public? Is the NGO 
claiming that it was difficult to engage Ford, even if it was not? How can Ford 
counter this inaccuracy? Comparing pre- and post-engagement assessments of 
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the factors in the model may generate key learnings that can be used to deal more 
effectively with future engagements, especially with regard to allocation of staff 
time. Most importantly, the model may also provide a framework for finding 
points of intervention that can swing the campaign in a more manageable 
direction. 
References 
22 
